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Barriers to Knowing and Being Known:
Constructions of (In)competence in Research
CASEY L. WOODFIELD and JUSTIN E. FREEDMAN
Rowan University

In this paper, we examine the barriers to, and possibilities of, recognizing individuals labelled intellectually
disabled as producers and contributors to knowledge about their experiences. Through engaging perspectives
within the fields of philosophy of education and disability studies, we examine contrasting research about the use
of facilitated communication, an augmentative and alternative communication technique for teaching people with
disabilities to communicate through pointing, or typing with support provided by a communication partner. We
examine how researchers impose demands for the scientific validation of facilitated communication and use such
demands to discredit autistic people identified with intellectual disabilities in their attempts to be recognized as
knowers and producers of knowledge. Our analysis calls into question whether self-imposed limitations on
contemporary knowledge production render educational research (in)capable of accepting forms of evidence that
will facilitate the agency of those labelled or regarded as intellectually disabled and (in)capable of providing
consumers of educational research access to knowledge that reflects the wide range of communicative,
neurocognitive, and intellectual diversity in schools and communities.

Introduction
In an ideal world these questions would not need to be asked because a diagnosis of autism
would not lead to branding a person as less than or inferior. Those who cannot speak or
who have limited speech would not immediately be labeled “intellectually disabled” and
“low functioning.” We would live in a society that would embrace diversity and welcome all
people, regardless of race, culture, religion, neurology or disability. Our education system
mirrors our society and in both, we come up short. (Zurcher-Long, 2019, p. 135)
Communication is a fundamental human right. Yet for individuals who do not use speech to be
understood, access to communication is often tenuous. An inability to speak has often been equated
with an inability to think. Such presumptions of incompetence are based on assumptions that
uncritically privilege speech as a preferred mode of communication and expected means through
which competence is demonstrated. In educational research and practice, people are commonly judged
as un/intelligent based on the ways that they communicate. Cultural constructions of what intelligence
looks and sounds like have contributed to the tendency for those who deviate from constructed norms
of communication to be pushed to the margins of knowledge production, and to educational contexts
with low expectations for academic achievement and social participation. Judgements of incompetence
towards those who do not speak to communicate constitute ableism, or a form of prejudicial belief that
unduly views disability as a deficit, often in comparison to culturally constructed ideas of normalcy
(Ashby, 2010; Baglieri & Lalvani, 2019). Though self-advocates, scholars, activists, and allies have
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worked to highlight the inaccuracy of assumptions about people’s competence based on their means of
communication, a propensity for individuals’ intelligence to be judged based on their communication
persists and contributes to misunderstandings about their lived experiences.
This tendency to equate communicative competence with intellectual ability is particularly true of
communication needs associated with disability labels that have historically been associated with
measures of intelligence, such as autism or other intellectual and developmental disabilities. As Emma
Zurcher-Long, an activist, writer, and public speaker who types to communicate, reminds us,
conceptions of autism, intellectual disability, and access to communication are intertwined and impact
one another. Autistic1 people who do not use speech as their preferred or most effective
communication method are often labelled or regarded as intellectually disabled. This occurs formally
through diagnostic assessments that rely on forms of communication, neurocognitive expression,
motor planning, and behaviour that hinder the performance of some autistic individuals on
assessments, therefore rendering them less likely to be regarded as intelligent (Courchesne, et al., 2015).
The use and results of such assessments make it seem as if intellectual disability is a discrete entity
that people have. Yet, as Kliewer, Biklen and Petersen (2015) argue, intellectual disability is better
understood as a metaphor for a global deficit in intelligence, a construct derived from and reinforced
by the tests which claim to assess it. Constructions of intelligence are also upheld socially and culturally
through normative expectations for behaviour and communication. These constructs, as Biklen and
Kliewer (2006) note, are what we have made of them. The interconnected perceptions of autism,
communication, and competence often render nonspeaking autistic people to be regarded as “disabledminded,” particularly in the absence of communication access or a shared understanding of alternative
and non-spoken forms of communication. As Taylor (2021) notes, “To treat someone as disabledminded is to treat them as globally deficient in their capacity as a knower, and to treat that deficiency as
arising from some objectively real fact about that person, rather than as a consequence of their social
positioning.” Disabled-mindedness both “enables and rationalizes the treatment of labelled people as
outside the community of knowers” (ibid., 2021). As we will argue in this paper, nonspeaking autistic
peoples’ positioning as disabled-minded constitutes a form of prejudice that is used as a basis for
invalidating the method through which some access communication, and ultimately to dismiss their
contributions to knowledge about their own experiences.
Facilitated communication (FC) is a technique that involves teaching people who do not use
speech reliably and who have movement differences to communicate by pointing, or typing with
support provided by a communication partner, or facilitator (Biklen & Cardinal, 1997; Crossley, 1994).
FC involves a combination of physical, emotional, and communicative support provided to an
individual (i.e., the person typing) by a trained facilitator, also known as a communication partner
(Crossley, 1994; Institute on Communication and Inclusion, 2000). In addition to verbal
encouragement and prompts, supports provided by a facilitator may involve proprioceptive feedback in
the form of backwards resistance to support stabilization, reduce impulsive movement, and/or support
initiation. FC is fluid and progressive, with the goal of faded support and increased independence
(Institute on Communication and Inclusion, 2000). Some people who have used FC have attained
increased levels of independence and exert agency over their lives (Rossetti, et al., 2008; Rubin, et al.,
2001), including learning to type without any physical support from a facilitator (Ashby, et al., 2015;
Rubin, et al., 2001). Some have developed the ability to read aloud their typed text and/or engage in
short spoken conversations (Broderick & Kasa-Hendrickson, 2001; Kasa-Hendrickson, Broderick, &
1

Language is an important and powerful choice. We intentionally use identity-first language to honour and affirm
autistic identity and the preferences of many in the autistic community (Bottema-Beutel, et al., 2021).
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Hanson, 2009). Others have been able to gain increased access to education, with some progressing to
higher education (Ashby & Causton-Theoharis, 2012; Bennett, 2011; Biklen & Burke, 2006; McKee &
Gomez, 2020; Peña, 2019).
Yet, FC remains controversial and has been dismissed by several researchers as pseudoscientific,
with many of the studies cited above dismissed as unacceptable evidence. These researchers’ critiques
of FC are rooted in a series of early studies that used controlled message-passing conditions to assess
the authenticity of communication produced with the support of a facilitator (e.g., Bebko, Perry, &
Bryson, 1996; Bomba, et al., 1996; Eberlin, et al., 1993; Shane & Kearns, 1994; Wheeler, et al., 1993).
These studies failed to consistently prove that people using FC were authoring their own messages and
some suggested instead that the facilitator was inadvertently influencing messages while providing
physical support. The possibility of facilitator influence found in these early research studies draws into
question whether the communication resulting from FC represents the actual thoughts and intentions
of those who use the method, particularly under those testing conditions. Importantly, some critics of
FC draw on the results of such message-passing studies to claim that FC always produces inauthentic
communication and therefore is universally harmful to the lives of any individuals who use FC (Travers,
Tincani, & Lang, 2014). These totalizing dismissals persist despite evidence from research using other
methodologies and in other published media.
The leap from extrapolation of results from research studies to outright dismissal of the
authenticity of communication from all users of FC poses dangers of its own. Critics not only argue
that FC is not scientifically valid, but they are also aghast that anyone, anywhere, continues to have
access to FC, and advocate that FC should cease to be offered as an option for communication support
(Lilienfeld, et al., 2015; Travers, 2017, Wombles, 2014). The pushback against FC has in fact resulted in
limiting access to the associated communication supports for students with disabilities, who already
face limited options for communication access (Bennett, 2011). Advocacy against people having access
to FC as an option for communication support is of particular concern given that those who have
learned to communicate through FC have called into question assumptions about their capacity to
think and the very nature of perceptions of autism and intellectual disability. Reflecting these
experiences, an increasing focus on sensorimotor differences is gradually shifting understandings of the
autistic experience away from a behavioural lens grounded in constructions of intellectual disability and
neurotypical behaviours, to account for the role of movement, sensory, stress, and neurocognitive
diversity that is both difficult to observe and may influence people’s performance, for example when
they type to communicate (Donnellan, Hill, & Leary, 2013). Through the use of FC, individuals with
limited or unreliable speech have demonstrated complex thoughts that exceed the intellectual capacity
with which they were initially judged. Further, they have challenged the assumption that those who
think, move, sense, and communicate in neurodivergent ways cannot be knowers, or knowledge
producers (Biklen & Burke, 2006; Kliewer, Biklen, & Petersen, 2015). To deny the use of FC and
dismiss the authenticity of those who type to communicate may restrict access to the very tools and
resources which some people might use to defy the deficit-based assumptions through which they are
described in research and wider society.
In this paper, we analyze arguments from researchers in education and social sciences who dismiss
the use of FC and deny the authorship of persons typing, on the grounds that FC has been determined
to be a scientifically invalid practice. Our purpose is to demonstrate how some researchers invoke selfimposed conditions for producing knowledge to place limits on what counts as evidence, and in doing
so, eclipse other documented evidence about autism, intelligence, and communication, as well as the
lived experiences and contributions of nonspeaking autistic people who type to communicate. To do
so, we examine critiques of FC and of the testimony made by those who type to communicate. We
consider how researchers’ demands for narrow criteria to validate FC limits the acceptable
methodological processes that could and do yield evidence about its impact. We further examine how
demands for scientific validation of individuals’ communication serve as a prerequisite to believing that
their thoughts are their own, thus providing a rationale to discredit autistic people who type to
communicate in their attempts to be recognized as knowers and producers of knowledge.
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We draw on Fricker’s (2007) work on epistemic injustice and Taylor’s (2018) work on epistemic
agency to argue that that the dismissal of FC and research by, and about, people who type to
communicate, perpetuates epistemic injustice by 1) denying the agency of nonspeaking autistic people
and hindering their participation in producing knowledge, and 2) impacting the potential for others
who are similarly situated to access future communication. We first examine the epistemological
orientation towards empiricism in special education research, which serves as the foundation for
dismissing the testimony of individuals who use FC and contributes to a continued gap in collective
understanding about autism, intelligence, and communication. Then, we examine how researchers use a
commitment to a specific kind of scientific validation to ground their dismissal of research of and by
those who use FC. Finally, we consider the notion of presuming competence as a potential corrective
virtue for addressing prejudicial judgements of credibility faced by nonspeaking autistic people. We
examine critiques of the presumption of competence that invoke demands for empirical scientific
validation, and consider how such demands may further limit the already diminished opportunities for
nonspeaking autistic people who use, or could use, FC as a means to access communication and
contribute knowledge about their lives.

Epistemic Injustice: Denying the Agency of People Who Type to Communicate
In philosophy, work on epistemic injustice examines how social groups are denied access to
contributing knowledge about social institutions when their testimony is denied credibility and they are
systematically excluded from knowledge production due to aspects of their social identity (Taylor,
2018). As Fricker (2007) notes, “any epistemic injustice wrongs a speaker2 in his capacity as a subject of
knowledge and thus in a capacity essential to human value” (p. 5). Thus, as Taylor (2018) has argued,
epistemic injustices undermine individuals’ ability to enact epistemic agency – or to create and convey
knowledge – particularly in academic research about and related to their lives. Fricker (2007) describes
two distinct types of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice, in which in which prejudice yields a
denial of a communicator’s testimonial credibility by a hearer3 (i.e., a recipient of communication), and
hermeneutical injustice, in which there is a gap in interpretative resources used to make social
experiences known within the collective understanding.
Fricker (ibid.) describes testimonial injustice as prejudice against a person, owing to their identity,
that wrongs them in their capacity to be heard by another. Testimonial injustice commonly occurs
when prejudice leads one to judge another’s credibility at a deficit, undermining the person’s capacity
for reason and to give knowledge. Judging another’s testimony at a deficit occurs not only as a result of
conscious discriminatory beliefs, but from the subtle influence of “identity prejudice,” discrimination
based on the social identity of the person (ibid., p. 27). We argue that in the case of facilitated
communication, this identity prejudice rests on ableist constructions of communication and
conceptions of disabled-mindedness (Taylor, 2021). The consequences of testimonial injustice involves
knowledge that is conveyed not being received, knowledge makers not being regarded as such, and the
potential for the inhibition of self-development.
Fricker (2007) describes another form of epistemic injustice – hermeneutical injustice – as “the
injustice of having some significant area of one’s social experience obscured from collective
understanding owing to a structural identity prejudice in the collective hermeneutical resources” (p.
155). The potential for hermeneutical injustice arises when there are insufficient resources for
interpreting the testimony of social groups, without the interference of prejudice having to do with
judgements of credibility. Fricker (ibid.) argues that judgements of credibility deficits can rise to the
2

We interpret “speaker” in this work broadly to represent all of the diverse and varied ways that people
communicate.
3
We interpret “hearer” in this work broadly to represent all the diverse and varies ways that people receive
communication.
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level of hermeneutical injustice when there is a gap in the resources needed to allow a marginalized
group to be heard (i.e., to contribute knowledge about their experiences).
In the following sections, we apply Fricker’s forms of epistemic injustice to examine the
conditions for knowledge production within educational research and judgements about the credibility
of people who use FC to convey knowledge about their experiences as nonspeaking autistic people. As
we will discuss, in the case of FC, researchers’ commitment to a specific type of scientific validation as
a prerequisite to believing the testimony of individuals who use FC creates a gap in hermeneutical
resources, constituting a hermeneutical injustice. Additionally, research about FC includes making
judgements about the credibility of the testimony of those who type to communicate. Making
judgements about the credibility of testimony is necessary and not inherently harmful. Yet, a deliberate
choice has been made among researchers to limit the conditions that might allow testimony to be
“heard.” We argue that dismissal of the testimony of those who type to communicate on the basis that
they do not meet those conditions, constitutes a form of testimonial injustice. We draw on examples of
both types of epistemic injustice to understand the ways in which some arguments about FC obscure
the epistemic agency of people who type to communicate through denials of credibility that hinge on
and perpetuate hermeneutical gaps in collective resources.

The Self-imposed Limitations of Education Research
There are not many of us [people who type to communicate] in academia. Our stories and experiences might
be dismissed as “just anecdotes” but this how we experience our progress, the changes FC brings to our lives,
the day-to-day message-passing that we don’t need to record, report or have validated by every single Very
Important People, usually privileged, non-disabled people, who call themselves “experts.” (Sequenzia, 2015)
In the above quote, Amy Sequenzia (2015), an activist and author who types to communicate,
highlights how people who type to communicate using FC are subject to having their experiences and
communication dismissed by researchers. Sequenzia refers to how critics of FC view knowledge
produced by individuals who type to communicate as “just anecdotes,” as opposed to legitimate
evidence that can inform knowledge about FC and those who use it. Sequenzia’s concerns are those of
marginalization from knowledge production, or what Fricker (2007) refers to as hermeneutical
marginalization. Compared to those who Sequenzia refers to as “Very Important People” – mostly
nondisabled researchers who hold status as experts – people who use FC have limited influence and
participation in practices which could contribute to knowledge about the communication of individuals
labelled with intellectual and developmental disabilities who do not use speech to communicate. As
Fricker (ibid.) argues, marginalization from participation in the spread of knowledge is often the result
of conditions that create a gap in the resources needed for a social group to render their experiences
intelligible – and we would add in the case of FC, legitimate.
Sequenzia draws attention to epistemological conditions that facilitate the hermeneutical
marginalization of people who use FC: the standard imposed on people who type to communicate to
have their communication validated under certain conditions before their voices and experiences can
be deemed authentic. Researchers critical of FC insist that testing using controlled message passing
provides the only satisfactory conditions for proving the authorship of a person typing (Hemsley, et al.,
2018). These message-passing conditions involve tasks that require individuals who type to
communicate to pass information unknown to their facilitator, often in instances in which typer and
facilitator are unaware of whether they are seeing the same or different prompts. Other researchers and
individuals who type to communicate have critiqued and demonstrated the barriers of the conditions of
message-passing studies, namely that they may not account for differences in the relationship and
training between facilitator and typer, nor the anxiety produced during unfamiliar, evaluative tasks, and
the effect of these factors on the outcome of the research (Cardinal, Hanson, & Wakeham, 1996;
Marcus & Shevin, 1997). In fact, when these methodological issues have been corrected for, some
message-passing studies have demonstrated authenticity of communication through such tasks
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(Cardinal, Hanson, & Wakeham, 1996; Sheehan & Matuozzi, 1996; Weiss, Wagner, & Bauman, 1996).
Further, other methodologies, such as eye tracking (Grayson, et al., 2012), lexical analysis of typed text
(Tuzzi, 2009), and development of speech during typing (Broderick & Kasa-Hendrickson, 2001; KasaHendrickson, Broderick, & Hanson, 2009) have provided evidence to validate typed communication
and to understand the influence that sensory and movement differences have on those who do or
could use FC (Donnellan, Hill, & Leary, 2013). This work has raised tensions around interpreting
performance on controlled tests as indicators of competence (Emerson, Grayson, & Griffiths, 2001).
Yet the findings of these studies are not considered scientifically valid by critics of FC because the
research methods do not rely on controlled message-passing tasks (Hemsley, et al., 2018).
Validating FC through message passing is a self-imposed requirement that aligns with a
commitment towards empiricism in special education research and which limits the types of data that
could provide evidence about the use of FC. Some researchers who have critiqued the use of FC as
pseudoscientific have done so on the grounds that it does not meet the criteria of a scientifically valid
and evidence-based practice (e.g., Mostert, 2014; Travers, 2017). Travers (2017) describes an evidencebased practice as “an intervention that is more likely to confer benefit than an unproven intervention
because it has been subjected to the most stringent scientific tests currently available” (p. 196). An
evidence-based practice framework in special education has emerged following calls to orient the field
towards empiricism in research, what Kauffman and Sasso (2006) describe as a “dedication to finding a
single truth as objectively as possible” (p. 111). Disability studies scholars, such as Gallagher (2004;
2006), have questioned the possibility of finding objective truths in researching disability and education
practices, on the grounds that theory and research procedures are never value free, and that the very
disability categories used to group and study people are themselves subjective. Nevertheless, the
empirically based framework of evidenced-based practices has become the predominant
epistemological orientation in the field of special education research. For example, the Council for
Exceptional Children (Cook, et al., 2014), the largest professional organization for special education in
the United States, uses evidenced-based practices as the standard for choosing effective practices,
thereby limiting acceptable evidence to quantitative research. Qualitative research is not mentioned, as
it does not fit within the guidelines or criteria of evidenced-based practices.
It is important to recognize that the criteria for validating communication advocated by some
researchers is not inevitable, but self-imposed, and then extrapolated to cast doubt about the testimony
of all people who type to communicate. The fact that FC users have not consistently demonstrated
authorship under message-passing conditions, coupled with early findings indicating the potential for
facilitator influence on messages under those conditions, is taken to mean that anyone who uses FC
must not be authoring their own ideas. Travers (2017) further argues that, given that FC has been
deemed ineffective according to this kind of scientific testing, it is unethical to teach people to use FC.
Travers, et al. (2014) go as far as to claim that “FC is unequivocally and universally damaging to people
with disabilities individually and as a group” (p. 196), a claim that, ironically, has not (and almost
certainly cannot) be empirically verified. Thus, researchers draw on a commitment to scientific
validation as grounds for judging the authenticity of communication produced by individuals who type
to communicate, and making recommendations for whether they should have access to FC at all. Such
conclusions reflect a concern raised by Danforth (1997) that a singular commitment to empirical
science in special education research could unduly limit educational practices by imposing a standard
that practices should be chosen only after being scientifically verified.
Researchers have further used self-imposed criteria for validating FC as the basis for dismissing
research that informs how and if FC is used. For example, Hemsley, et al. (2018) conducted a
systematic review of FC studies from 2014 to 2018. The authors found three recent qualitative research
studies (Ashby, et al., 2015; Wilson, et al., 2014; Woodfield, Jung, & Ashby, 2014), but excluded them
on the grounds that their review was limited to identifying studies that first tested message passing.
Findings of the excluded research studies offer insights into the practice of, and skills required for,
fading support (Ashby, et al., 2015; Wilson, et al., 2014); training new facilitators (Woodfield, Jung, &
Ashby, 2014); and nuances of conditions under which independence is possible (Ashby, et al., 2015).
Each of these studies included data from produced by people who type to communicate. Because these
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studies did not first validate authorship using a controlled message-passing test, they were dismissed
from contributing to knowledge about FC.
Another example of how contributions to knowledge are obscured from the collective
understanding about autism and communication is by discrediting as evidence research that cites
qualitative data from people who type or spell to communicate. Vyse, et al. (2019) questioned the
conclusions of an article by Jaswal and Akhtar (2019) on the grounds that the authors included
quotations and citations from individuals who use FC and rapid prompting method (RPM), a related
methodology used to teach access to spelling for education and communication. Jaswal and Akhtar
(2019) argued that their findings should question the assumption in psychology that autism is a deficit
in social motivation. However, Vyse, et al. (2019) asserted that because the authors used quotes from
individuals who use FC and RPM to communicate as evidence in their research, “the credibility of their
arguments is seriously compromised” (para 1). Such exclusions are of particular consequence given that
past evidence from qualitative research has pointed to potential flaws in the very conditions critics
suggest for testing FC, and has contributed knowledge about the experiences of people who do type to
communicate. Cardinal and Falvey (2014) point out that research in the decades since early messagepassing studies has revealed a pattern of more naturalistic, qualitative studies (over 100) and fewer
quantitative studies (approximately 40). They note:
This may demonstrate that researchers have come to recognize that they learn much more about the
process of FC through qualitative, as compared with quantitative research. Where nearly all
quantitative research has been focused on the efficacy of FC, research using qualitative methods of
inquiry have focused more on the systematic development of the method, searching for what works
best, for whom and the conditions thereof.” (p. 190)

Yet, within the self-imposed criteria of scientific validation, qualitative research is not recognized as
evidence. Williams (2020) argues that the dismissal of qualitative research as amounting to anecdotes,
rather than legitimate evidence in support of FC, relies on “rhetorics of evacuation” that take away
from the experiences, possibilities, and tensions raised by people who have learned to type to
communicate through FC (p. 222). A salient consequence of such evacuation is to perpetuate the
“literate invisibility” of people who type to communicate, by discounting the very evidence that would
demand an acknowledgment of their literacy (Kliewer, Biklen, & Kasa-Hendrickson, 2006, p. 167).
Claims about FC as being a “pseudoscientific treatment” (Tostanoski, et al., 2014, p. 220),
“therapeutic quackery” (Travers & Ayers, 2015, p. 371), and a “fad treatment” (Wombles, 2014, p.
181), are thus made possible by systematically discounting certain forms of evidence, and lived
experiences, that support the use of FC. We argue that the self-imposed conditions set by researchers
to justify evacuating from, or willfully disregarding, the knowledge produced by individuals who use FC
rises to the level of perpetuating hermeneutical injustice. People who type to communicate have a
vested interest in having their voices heard, yet their attempts to communicate knowledge about their
experiences are dismissed, owing to a lack of resources in the current conditions of knowledge
production that would allow their communication to be rendered intelligible. These injustices grow out
of and perpetuate the hermeneutical gap in resources available to understand the experiences and
possibilities of nonspeaking autistic people.
In the next section, we examine how researchers use a self-imposed standard for scientifically
validated communication as a means to delegitimize the published testimony of autistic people who
type to communicate. We argue that a denial of the testimony of individuals who type to communicate
constitutes epistemic injustice that limits options for communication access of current and future
autistic people who do not use speech to communicate, and discounts evidence that challenges ableist
constructions of intelligence, competence, and disability.

Casey L. Woodfield and Justin E. Freedman

183

Epistemic Injustice in Denying the Credibility of Testimony
I am so ready to let the world know that they are all wrong about autism. Yes, I am autistic. It’s a part of
me. A hard way to be in this world with a certain perspective. Many people dread the idea that we could
actually exist in many numbers, because no one visualizes us this way, with thinking minds intact. Having a
voice leaves hard questions for people to answer. People do not want to think that they have been so wrong for
so long, which makes it hard to really see me, and others like me. Day in and day out I deal with all of these
challenges. Believe me, I get it why people have such a hard time with this. All I ask is that you try to have
an open mind to ideas that defy existing ones. (Barmache, 2019, p. 95)
To “have an open mind to ideas that defy existing ones,” as Dillan Barmache, an advocate and author
who types to communicate, urges, requires a critical evaluation of the questions being asked and the
methods used to answer them. In contrast to special education scholars who situate their work within
the paradigm of empirical science, many researchers in the field of disability studies in education have
embraced qualitative methodologies to offer interpretive resources with which people identified with
disabilities can have greater participation in producing research and knowledge based on their lived
experiences. Much of these efforts are born out of a recognition of the hermeneutical marginalization
that we have discussed, and the need to create resources to promote epistemic agency, particularly for
those labelled and regarded as intellectually disabled (Ashby, 2011; Taylor, 2018). Baglieri, et al. (2011)
describe researchers in disability studies in education as “taking great care that we do not use research
as a means of excluding the voices of people with disabilities … [Rather] we aim to use research as a
vehicle for their voices so that they can tell their own stories and share their own goals, aspirations, and
needs” (p. 273). The reach of such efforts may be limited, however, if the voices of people with
disabilities are dismissed as not credible, and the individuals are perceived to not have the capacity to
interpret their own experiences. As we have shown, people who use facilitated communication face
judgements of deficits in their credibility. These judgements may rise to the level of testimonial injustice
when they are the result of prejudice that unduly undercuts the credibility of communication at an
individual level.
In several instances, scholars have attempted to support the epistemic agency of people
labelled as intellectually disabled and who type to communicate by co-constructing research with them.
However, critics of FC have questioned, or in some cases dismissed, the testimony of people who use
FC in published work. For example, articles by Biklen and Burke (2006) and Rubin, et al. (2001) are coauthored by Burke and by Rubin, two autistic people who learned to type to communicate
independently using FC and who have at one point, prior to having access to communication, been
either labelled or regarded as intellectually disabled. This research puts forth ideas for rethinking
approaches to schooling for individuals identified with intellectual and developmental disabilities
(Biklen & Burke, 2006), and questions prevailing notions of intelligence and competence (Rubin, et al.,
2001). On the grounds that the co-authors who type to communicate have not had their authorship
scientifically verified under message-passing conditions, critics have discredited their testimony and
excluded these contributions to the study of schooling and the construction of intelligence. One of the
ways that the credibility of typers’ testimony is denied is through use of language that casts doubt on
their contributions by nature of how they were produced. For example, Travers and Ayers (2015)
express both skepticism and outright dismissal of the authenticity of Burke’s and Rubin’s published
ideas, based on their identities as autistic authors who type to communicate. They first cast doubt on
Burke’s and Rubin’s contributions by referring to Burke as “a person with autism who reads aloud
messages attributed to him generated via FC,” and to Rubin, et al.’s article as including “statements
generated via FC and attributed to Rubin” (p. 373–374). When discussing Biklen and Burke’s (2006)
article, Travers and Ayers (2015) write that Burke “allegedly offers his insight about the ideal school” in
the article. In their most direct denial of Burke’s contributions to research, the authors assert that given
that FC is not considered scientifically valid, “we must conclude that words attributed to Burke are not
reflective of his own true thoughts, opinions, or experiences; they instead represent the subconscious
thoughts of his facilitator(s)” (p. 373). Importantly, Travers and Ayers (ibid.) offer no empirical
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evidence for their conclusion that Burke and Rubin did not author their own thoughts, and further,
disregard documentation of their independent typing. The fact that they have not proven their
authorship by undergoing a controlled message-passing test is evidently sufficient for the authors to
conclude that the testimony is not credible.
Outside of academic research, autistic people, including those who type to communicate, have
documented their experiences in popular media, often in resistance to and in ways that reflect their
marginalization from educational and social institutions. Published autobiographies, documentary films,
and blogging continue to be mechanisms through which the autistic and neurodivergent community,
disability justice community scholars, and disability rights activists push back against the
marginalization of their knowledge in research and practice about their lives. However, in academic
discourse, scholars opposed to FC have discredited testimony in media by people who type to
communicate. For example, Lilienfeld, et al. (2015) question the authenticity of The Reason I Jump: The
Inner Voice of a Thirteen-Year-Old Boy with Autism (2013), a best-selling book written by Naoki Higashida
and translated by David Mitchell that describes the first-person experiences, preferences, and opinions
of an autistic adolescent who types to communicate. Higashida reported initially receiving physical
support by his mother in his writing, later learning to type independently. Lilienfeld, et al. (2015) assert
that it is “difficult to evaluate” claims that Higashida types independently “without videotaped footage,
which is unavailable as of this writing” (p. 83). “Moreover,” the authors write, “there is at present no
scientific documentation of Higashida’s achievements” (p. 72). Lilienfeld, et al. (ibid.) do not clarify
what comprises independence, what they refer to as “achievements,” nor what constitutes sufficient
“scientific documentation” that would grant Higashida testimonial credibility.
While critics of FC most often link their critiques to the language of scientific evidence, Lilienfeld,
et al. (ibid.) also draw upon their personal observations to question the authenticity of the voices of
individuals who type to communicate. At one point, the authors discuss the documentary film Wretches
and Jabberers (Wurzburg, 2010), which chronicles the journey of two autistic men in their efforts to
change attitudes about autism and competence. The film stars Larry Bissonnette and Tracy Thresher,
two individuals who type to communicate with support from facilitators. The authors proceed to
question the authenticity of Bissonnette’s and Thresher’s communication through their responses to
the film, by recounting personal observations:
The third author of this article (J.T.T.) has seen Thresher on two occasions in 2005 and 2008, and
interacted directly with Bissonnette, including having lunch with him without his facilitator, never
once witnessing him either type or communicate independently in a cognitively sophisticated
manner. In contrast, Thresher can speak and can read what is produced for him by his facilitator’s
intervention, raising questions concerning why he requires FC to communicate. (p. 82)

This passage serves to cast doubt on Bissonnette’s and Thresher’s ability to communicate authentically,
and bleeds into commentary about Bissonnette’s perceived intelligence, both of which serve to deny
their testimonial credibility. The third author’s observations during lunch with Bissonnette, for which
the context is not described, are submitted as evidence that Bissonnette is not “cognitively
sophisticated” (no criteria for this evaluation are provided). The two occasions in which the author
“has seen Thresher” (the setting is not mentioned) speak and read aloud his typed text are then used to
question why Thresher otherwise requires support to communicate. Bissonnette is thus portrayed as
not capable of the complex thoughts he communicates in Wretches and Jabberers, and Thresher is
characterized as either too capable to really need to use FC, or not capable of his own thoughts if what
he read and spoke is assumed to be the thoughts of his facilitator. The authors’ inclusion of anecdotal
evidence to question the authenticity of Bissonnette’s and Thresher’s thoughts is striking when
considered alongside the authors’ earlier dismissal of qualitative data and first-person perspectives as
being too “anecdotal” to be considered evidence of credible communication through typing (p. 70).
The influence of prejudicial assumptions on credibility and competence are apparent when the
third author in the article by Lilienfeld, et al. (2015) evaluates Bissonnette’s and Thresher’s capacities to
communicate during a meal (Bissonnette) and at an undisclosed distance (Thresher). The third author’s
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description of Bissonnette as not appearing “sophisticated” appeals to common sense ideas about
intelligence and implies that Bissonnette does not have the capacity to produce knowledge. Further, the
evidence submitted raises the question: if the third author had seen evidence of “cognitively
sophisticated” communication at lunch, would this “anecdotal” evidence then call into question the
premise of the authors’ arguments that FC is scientifically invalid? Such casual judgements demonstrate
how claims about disability using the language of scientific objectivity become interconnected with
prejudiced assumptions and appeals to common sense. As Samuels (2014) argues, (dis)ability is often
constructed through a diagnostic gaze that invokes both elements of scientific discourse and shared
cultural understandings of what constitutes (dis)ability and (in)competence. Lilienfeld, et al. (2015) rely
on cultural constructions of independence and competence to privilege their own experiences and
judgements as legitimate while having previously dismissed similar forms of evidence from people who
use FC.
Together, the examples above illustrate a pattern in how the testimony of those who use FC is
discredited on an individual basis. This denial of credibility amounts to testimonial injustice in that the
judgements of critics depend upon identity prejudice – in this case, presumptions about the capabilities
of nonspeaking autistic people whose communication challenges conceptions of competence. While
critics cite the authors’ methods of communication as a justification for dismissing their testimony,
their arguments are implicitly rooted in disabled-mindedness, hinging on deficit-based constructions of
autistic people who do not use speech as their primary mode of communication. Namely, the fact that
authors have been labelled or regarded as intellectually disabled and also type to communicate, creates
the default assumption that they are incompetent and not credible until they prove their credibility
under conditions that satisfy researchers. Such critiques of the contributions of individuals who use FC
employ a standard for accepting their epistemic agency that goes beyond what people who speak to
communicate are held to.
Further, the dismissal of testimony at the individual level is supported by elements of
hermeneutical injustice, which we previously discussed. Critics refer to the criteria for scientific
validation through message passing as a prerequisite, and the only satisfactory evidence, that would
allow them to deem the authors’ testimony to be credible. When the authors do not meet these
conditions for evidence, researchers, one by one, discount their published testimony. Thus people who
type to communicate are denied epistemic agency and excluded from contributing knowledge about
their capabilities and about the marginalization that they experience. The researchers’ self-imposed
criteria serve to “evacuate” knowledge (Williams, 2020) that could, and otherwise does, contribute to
the collective understanding about autism, intellectual disability, and communication. This is
particularly consequential when the knowledge that is dismissed could, and does, call into question
accepted theories of autism and intellectual disability, and challenges ableist constructions of
communication, intelligence, and competence. Rather than being understood as informants, the
background conditions (i.e., self-imposed criteria for credible testimony) hinder the attempts of
individuals who use FC to make their experiences intelligible.
To this point, we have argued that the self-imposed conditions for evidence of authentic
communication of people who type to communicate, and the use of such criteria as grounds to
individually discredit their testimony of their lived experiences, constitutes epistemic injustice. Autistic
people who use FC are repeatedly marginalized and deemed not credible in their attempts to contribute
knowledge of their experiences. This pattern reflects residual prejudice towards nonspeaking autistic
people who type to communicate, owing to their identities and modes of communication, which
facilitates their epistemic exclusion. Disrupting forms of epistemic injustice require an adjustment on
the part of hearers (receivers of communication), or what Fricker (2007) refers to as a corrective virtue
based on an awareness of the prejudicial conditions faced by individuals in their attempts to
communicate.
In the next section, we examine the notion of presuming competence, an idea that has emerged in
response to prejudice faced by people labelled or regarded as intellectually disabled, including
presumptions of their incompetence. We consider the potential for presumption of competence as a
virtue for correcting against epistemic injustice in both research and everyday practice.
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Presuming Competence and Epistemic (In)justice
Even though my friends and I possess intelligent ideas, the people in the educational system for the most part
have historically not understood how to educate us. Teaching kids, parents, and teachers is one of my goals. I
want to plot out the path toward training teachers to look at their students with a wide lens of possibility.
The lens is the way to see the pupil’s intelligence that is always there but sometimes has difficulty coming out
through communication. It is imperative that educators think about presuming competence and look for ways
to see the intelligence in all of us. The student should not have to prove they are capable of learning. The
school needs to provide the educational experiences to teach the student literacy, communication, and skills to
be a learner. (Thresher, 2019, p. 39)
Countering epistemic injustices requires virtues that correct for the influence of the prejudice that
underlies and facilitates credibility judgements; this necessitates “virtuous hearers” who listen (i.e.,
receive communication) in particular ways (Fricker, 2007). In the case of testimonial injustices, the
virtuous hearer engages in critical reflexivity that confronts the possibility that low credibility
judgements grow out of prejudice, and adjusts to compensate “to reach the degree of credibility that
would have been given were it not for the prejudice” (ibid., p. 92). In the case of correcting for
hermeneutical injustice, the virtuous hearer must have a heightened awareness of how a gap in
hermeneutical resources may contribute to reducing the intelligibility of a communicator’s attempts to
convey knowledge, and therefore either adjust or suspend credibility judgements (ibid.). Thus, building
on one another, both testimonial justice and hermeneutical justice require active, corrective virtues on
the part of the receiver of communication that seek to neutralize the impact of identity prejudice in
exchanges with communicators. In this section, we describe the presumption of competence as a virtue
of both kinds – hermeneutical and testimonial – with which to correct for epistemic injustices
experienced by nonspeaking autistic people who type to communicate. Growing out of educational
practice, the presumption of competence has corrective possibilities both within exchanges between
interlocutors and within the constructions of disability in academic research that impacts the
hermeneutical resources on communicative access and experiences.
The presumption of competence is a principle of approaching people, particularly students with
disabilities, in which educators:
Assume that a child has intellectual ability, provide opportunities to be exposed to learning, assume the
child wants to learn and assert him or herself in the world. To not presume competence is to assume that
some individuals cannot learn, develop, or participate in the world. Presuming competence is nothing less
than a Hippocratic oath for educators. It is a framework that says, approach each child as wanting to be
fully included, wanting acceptance and appreciation, wanting to learn, wanting to be heard, wanting to
contribute. By presuming competence, educators place the burden on themselves to come up with ever
more creative, innovative ways for individuals to learn. (Biklen, 2012)

The concept of presuming competence has evolved out of a history of research and practice rooted in
a commitment to studying disability as a complex sociocultural phenomenon, rather than as the
individual deficit that it is represented as in discourse (Biklen & Burke, 2006). Bogdan and Taylor
(1976) discussed “a concept of intelligence [grounded in] human dimensions,” and later the “social
construction of humanness” (1989) in relationships between people with and without disabilities.
Goode (1994) used the “emic” perspective in similar ways to which Linneman (2001) later
characterized attributions of “mindedness” as contextual and relational.
To resist the educational consequences of presumed incompetence, Donnellan (1984) developed
the “criterion of the least dangerous assumption … [which] holds that in the absence of conclusive
data, educational decisions ought to be based on assumptions which, if incorrect, will have the least
dangerous effect on the student” (p. 142). Scholars and practitioners alike have taken up Donnellan’s
criterion as a socially just lens for approaching the education and support of students with disabilities
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with complex communication needs, positioning the act of presuming competence as the least
dangerous assumption in educational contexts (Jorgensen, 2005; Jorgensen, McSheehan, &
Sonnenmeier, 2007). The presumption of competence has been primarily located in educational
research and practice in response to the experiences of people with intellectual and developmental
disability labels, including autism, who, when securing access to communication training and associated
supports, demonstrate capabilities previously unexpected of them (Rubin, et al., 2001).
We consider presuming competence to be a response to epistemic injustice that occurs when a
prejudice on the part of a receiver of communication clouds their ability to receive a communicator’s
words (Fricker, 2007). The notion of presuming competence is espoused with the intention of
countering how people with disabilities have been regarded, educated, and (mis)understood, as a result
of beliefs that link the ability to speak and move reliably with the ability to think (Biklen & Kliewer,
2006; Broderick & Kasa-Hendrickson, 2006). Countering such ableist ideas involves transcending
constructions of intelligence predicated on expectations for reliable verbal speech and motor planning
(Ashby, 2010; Broderick & Kasa-Hendrickson, 2006; Donnellan, Hill & Leary, 2013), and broadening
notions of competence and conceptions of modalities through which competence can be demonstrated
(Ashby, 2011). With its intention to counter prejudicial beliefs and practices, we can conceive of
presuming competence as a sort of corrective virtue in the face of epistemic injustice. Scholars’
description of presuming competence demonstrates a critical, reflective openness on the part of the
receiver of communication to the possibility of credibility on the part of the communicator (in this
case, a nonspeaking autistic person who types to communicate). Further, correcting for prejudice
requires an awareness on the part of the hearer about the social theories, or generalizations that they
have come to internalize about a social group, and which may influence their judgements of credibility.
For example, Kliewer, Biklen, & Petersen (2015) describe presuming competence as requiring a
“suspension of a deficit ideology” that is commonly held towards autistic people labelled or regarded as
intellectually disabled. Biklen and Burke (2006) write that to presume competence is “not to project an
ableist interpretation on something another person does but rather to presume there must be a
rationale or sympathetic explanation for what someone does and then to try to discover it, always from
the other person’s own perspective” (p. 168). Presuming competence thus counters the disabledmindness and ableism that underlies credibility judgements about nonspeaking autistic people who type
to communicate, and encourages hearers to offset the impact of prejudice within such judgements.
There is also evidence that such a virtue can and has aided in increasing opportunities for
epistemic agency and constructing more “inclusive hermeneutical micro-climates” – contexts in which
the marginalization of the communicator is acknowledged by the hearer, and identity prejudice is
corrected for (Fricker, 2007, p. 171). Collaborative research with people who type to communicate is an
example of efforts to construct such a context (e.g., Biklen & Burke, 2006; Rubin, et al., 2001).
Research that has moved beyond presumptions of incompetence in people who do not use reliable
speech to communicate has generated new understanding about the neurological, motor, and sensory
differences that contribute to barriers to communication, particularly for nonspeaking autistic people
(Donnellan, Hill, & Leary, 2013; Torres, et al., 2013). In other words, the often unacknowledged
challenges of organizing and regulating one’s body in response to sensory and movement demands (i.e.,
those required for speech or independent pointing) are becoming more widely understood as the
underlying experiences of actions and behaviours associated with autism that are too often
(mis)interpreted (Donnellan, Hill, & Leary, 2013) – or, as Biklen (2005) writes: “the problem is not one
of understanding, but of doing” (p. 267). Upholding an ethic of presuming competence has allowed
research to begin to methodologically account for the experiences that autistic people have reported for
decades. This process serves as a model for actively seeking out, centering, and honouring the
epistemic agency of nonspeaking autistic people by aligning their reported experiences with study
aimed at understanding and supporting – not fixing. This work serves as an exemplar of the conditions
necessary for research to counter epistemic injustice. For people who use FC specifically, the growing
understanding of sensory and motor differences, augmented by documented first-person perspectives
and neuroscience, has implications for better understanding the need for dynamic, individualized
approaches to support, how to most effectively fade that support over time, and what other strategies
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(i.e., to support sensory, movement, organization, and emotional regulation) could further augment
communication. This knowledge offers an example of new meanings that emerge that fill a
hermeneutical gap when research methods centre and align with experiences of people who have access
to alternative forms of communication to reduce the effects of hermeneutical marginalization. This
work makes clear that a presumption of competence also involves understanding the role of sensory,
motor, and neurological differences, or other experiences that cannot be observed, and honouring
autistic ways of being in correcting for epistemic injustice.

Virtuous or Irresponsible: Critiques of the Presumption of Competence
Critics of FC have critiqued the notion of presuming competence, asserting that it is anything but
virtuous. In their discussion of presuming competence, Travers and Ayers (2015) argue that
encouraging practitioners (e.g., teachers) to presume competence itself leads to prejudice, and that the
position should be dismissed in favour of professional objectivity. They assert: “Effective teachers do
not rely on prejudiced decision-making processes and instead rely on objective measures of student
performance to determine whether students have learned” (ibid., p. 378). The authors later conclude
that: “The responsible position is to suspend judgment about the person’s competence and insist on
sound (i.e., reliable, valid, verifiable) and objective evidence” (p. 384). Travers and Ayers’s
recommendation to form judgements based on objective evidence could be understood as its own
corrective epistemic virtue, intended to correct for the potential for what Fricker (2007) refers to as
credibility excess. In other words, Travers and Ayers (2015) take the position that the presumption of
competence could lead professionals to perceive capacities in people labelled or regarded as
intellectually disabled that are not really there, thus lending an unduly high credibility to their
communication.
To consider if Travers and Ayers’s (2015) position could correct for potential epistemic injustice,
we should ask whether presuming nothing about an individual’s capabilities and making a judgement
based on an objective interpretation of data is possible, or desirable. First, returning to Fricker (2007), a
key force behind testimonial injustice is that receivers of communication are influenced by
generalizations about groups within the collective imagination of their social context. This leads to
“residual prejudices” that influence initial judgements of people’s credibility (p. 89). Indeed, researchers
within the field of disability studies have frequently cast doubt on the possibility that, within the
cultural, historical, and political context that imbues disability with meaning, nondisabled people could
have a non-prejudicial view of people identified with disabilities. As Clare (2017) argues, the term
“mental retardation,” the former label used to refer to intellectual disability, reflects assumptions about
people’s capacities and comes with expectations and stereotypes. “The diagnosis of mental
retardation,” Clare asserts, “is often dangerous, sometimes useful, but never neutral, never merely
descriptive” (p. 42). Similarly, Yergeau (2018) examines the various ways that the lives of autistic people
have already been “authored,” within the discourses of scientific research and wider culture, including
by portraying autistic people as lacking certain human capacities (p. 141).
Clare (2017) and Yergeau (2018) point to how the very foundation and history of disability labels
are entangled with assumptions of deficits in competence that foster prejudice regarding the identity
(i.e., labels) of autism and intellectual disability. Importantly, as these authors argue, the construction of
intellectual disability and autism as deficits is often based on putatively “objective” data (i.e.,
intelligence testing that requires reliable speech and motor control). Such data are written into
educational documents that become institutional biographies of children, serving as the sources of the
objective data that Travers and Ayers (2015) endorse as the foundation for forming judgements about a
child’s competence. In doing so, the authors appear unaware of the pervasiveness of ableism, through
both prejudice and deficit-based scientific constructions of disability, in “authoring” (Yergeau, 2018, p.
141) a professional judgement about people labelled as intellectually disabled. Returning to Taylor’s
(2021) notion of disabled-mindedness, people labelled as intellectually disabled are already subject to
being treated as having a deficiency in their capacity as knowers in educational contexts, owing to the
presumption that their deficit-based labels reflect objective facts, as opposed to interpretations based
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on limited understandings and prejudice towards atypical communication. That the authors imagine a
world in which able-bodied and able-minded professionals can, and do, routinely engage with people
identified as disabled without prejudice is ironic in the context of critiquing the presumption of
competence; were such an ableist-free culture to exist, there would be no need for a virtue of
presuming competence to begin with, and thus no critique of the concept by the authors would have
been made.
Travers and Ayers (2015) also dismiss the usefulness of the presumption of competence on the
basis that there is no evidence of its efficacy. In arguing that presuming competence should not be
promoted, the authors point out that “no empirical research on PC [presuming competence] has been
conducted to substantiate the claim it preserves dignity” (p. 371). Further, they submit that “no
published experimental study of PC is available in professional literature. Thus, there exists no evidence
to support PC as a practical idea” (p. 374). The authors’ demand for empirical proof of what happens
when people (i.e., teachers) presume competence is consistent with the expectation of scientific testing
for endorsing practices as evidence based. In other words, the authors treat an ethical position and
philosophy for guiding action as a practice, or intervention, that must be evaluated to determine causal
effect. Returning to our earlier discussion, such a position imposes a demand for certain types of
evidence as determined by researchers. The demand for empirical validation to endorse an ethical
position raises concerns over the role of researchers in limiting the diversity of efforts to resist social
exclusion and discrimination. Such a standard runs the risk of privileging scientific rationality over
responding to the historical and political contexts in which people’s lives are situated (Danforth, 2006).

Discussion
I worry about the future of autistic people who type. I wonder if there will be any advancement with research.
I hope that there will be more inclusion and acceptance that autism does not automatically mean – can’t,
won’t, or doesn’t. There is a saying in the disabilities community, “Nothing about us, without us.” A
complete rethinking about autism and autistic neurology is needed if special education schools or any schools
are going to educate those of us who think differently. Believing in the potential of all students is not on any
test. The presumption that each and every student, whether they can speak or not, can and will eventually
learn given the necessary supports and encouragement is not common, but it should be. (Zurcher-Long,
2019, 142)
The treatment of facilitated communication in research literature raises an epistemological quandary: a
practice that is not validated by what researchers deem as necessary scientific testing is nevertheless
essential in contributing to the epistemic agency of people who, because of their ways of being,
thinking, moving, and communicating, have been historically and hermeneutically marginalized from
participating in knowledge production. Our analysis calls into question whether the self-imposed
limitations for producing knowledge that some researchers call for render educational research
incapable of both facilitating access to communication for people labelled or regarded as intellectually
disabled and providing consumers with knowledge that demonstrates the competence of such
individuals. Specifically, the use of self-imposed limitations to justify the dismissing of testimony
impedes efforts to convey knowledge that counters contemporary assumptions about the autistic
experience and the treatment of disabled people as epistemic outsiders. These conditions serve to
eclipse the voices of individuals who type to communicate in ways that constitute an epistemic injustice
by denying their contributions to knowledge and setting a goal post, determined by professionals who
simultaneously discount other evidence that informs the use of FC, that disabled people must meet
before being deemed credible. Additionally, these conditions serve to limit the choice of
communication options available to people for whom they may be most appropriate. Nonspeaking
people cannot afford to continually wait for increased opportunities to “prove their membership” as
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literate and competent citizens amidst restrictive notions of what counts as acceptable evidence of their
communicated knowledge and experiences (Kliewer, Biklen, & Kasa-Hendrickson, 2006, p. 187).
If research about nonspeaking autistic people labelled or regarded as intellectually disabled is not
up to the task of facilitating epistemic agency, it is necessary to consider alternative conditions for
knowledge production that can dismantle, rather than perpetuate, forms of epistemic injustice.
Virtuous behaviour at the level of individual encounters (i.e., by presuming competence) may aid in
supporting a critical openness towards alternative forms of communication, and reduce instances of
credibility deficits. However, the impact may be limited without addressing the ways that nonspeaking
autistic people are marginalized to begin with, through a gap in hermeneutical resources needed to
allow them to inform the world of their own experiences and ways of communicating. To provide the
epistemic conditions in which such people can be recognized as “knowledge citizens” (Taylor, 2018),
researchers must not outright discredit their testimony, even when it challenges current conceptions of
what counts as evidence. This will involve applying the same skepticism towards self-imposed
limitations on producing knowledge that is invoked by critics when discussing FC. Such skepticism
towards a singular commitment to empirical science would recognize that multiple methods are needed
to understand a phenomenon, and that the conclusions of researchers, even a consensus, are always
temporal.
Moreover, we argue that researchers should reorient their efforts to seeking ways to promote
epistemic agency, particularly given the evident risk of epistemic injustice in failing to do so. This
requires an active acknowledgement that methodological decisions, by definition, have consequences
on knowledge production (Dindar, Lindblom, & Kärnä, 2017). Thus, such decisions must be made in
collaboration with members of the community in which the research is situated. To do so requires
conditions that create parallels between designing collaborative inquiry across communicative and
neurocognitive diversity, and building communication support partnerships (such as those developed in
FC). In both contexts, trust and agency are paramount epistemic conditions that are antithetical to the
current search for evidence that relies upon deficit constructions of disability. Rather, methodologies
and methods that “center and reclaim disability” (Lester & Nusbaum, 2017) can align to enhance
participation in knowledge production. Such collaborative efforts involve the virtuous approach of
constructing hermeneutically inclusive micro-climates (Fricker, 2007) through which new knowledge
can be created and disseminated to fill the hermeneutical gap that exists around experiences and
possibilities of nonspeaking autistic people who do, or could, type to communicate. This work not only
challenges who engages in research and how, but also what forms research processes take, ideally
mirroring the range of communicative diversity around which they centre.
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